Deep neural networks (DNNs) are used to solve complex classification problems, for which other machine learning classifiers, such as SVM, fall short. Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have been used for tasks that involves sequential inputs, such as speech to text. In the cyber security domain, RNNs based on API calls have been used effectively to classify previously un-encountered malware. In this paper, we present a blackbox attack against RNNs, focusing on finding adversarial API call sequences that would be misclassified by a RNN without affecting the malware functionality. We also show that this attack is effective against many classifiers, due-to the transferability principle between RNN variants, feed-forward DNNs and traditional machine learning classifiers such as SVM. Finally, we implemented GADGET, a software framework to convert any malware binary to a binary undetected by an API calls based malware classifier, using the proposed attack, without access to the malware source code. We conclude by discussing possible defense mechanisms and countermeasures against the attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have outperformed other machine learning algorithms in many complex problem domains ( [20] ), such as image recognition, etc.
When the input is a sequence, recurrent neural networks (RNNs) and their variants (LSTM, GRU, etc.) outperform other classifiers. This is true for both classification tasks, such as video classification and machine translation, and for generative models, such as handwriting text generation. This success led cyber security experts to use RNNs for malware classification tasks. Application programming interface (API) calls, often used to characterize the behavior of a program, is a common input choice. Since only the sequence of API calls gives each API call the context and proper meaning, APIcalls based RNNs are a good match, providing state of the art performance ( [30] ).
As reviewed in [24] , machine learning classifiers and algorithms are vulnerable to different kinds of attacks, aimed at undermining the classifier's integrity, availability, etc. One such attack is the generation of adversarial examples: Originally correctly classified input, which are perturbed to be assigned a different label. In this paper, we demonstrate an attack like this on RNN binary classifier, used to differentiate between malicious and benign API call sequences. Therefore, in our case, the adversarial example would be a malicious API call sequence, originally correctly classified by the RNN; however, after the perturbation (which doesn't affect the malware functionality) the sequence is classified by the RNN as benign (a form of evasion attack).
The contributions of our paper are: 1) We implement a novel end-to-end method to generate adversarial examples for an RNN malware classifier. Unlike previous papers, we focus on the cyber security domain and implement a method that will preserve the functionality of the malware after the perturbation, using a mimicry attack. 2) We implement a black-box attack; that is, the adversary doesn't know the attacked RNN model architecture and hyper-parameters, a more realistic attack scenario than a white-box attack. We also implement GADGET, an evasion framework generating a new malware binary with the perturbed API calls sequence without access to the malware source code. Finally, we test our implementation against various types of machine learning malware classifiers trained on a dataset of 500,000 malware and benign samples, showing that the proposed attack is feasible and an immediate threat. 3) We focus on the principle of transferability in RNN variants. While this subject has been covered within the past in the context of DNNs, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time it has been evaluated in the context of RNNs, proving that the proposed attack is effective against the largest number of classifiers ever reviewed in a single paper, including architectures that have not been compared before for API call based malware classification: RNN, LSTM, GRU, their bidirectional and deep variants, feed-forward DNN, 1D CNN, SVM, random forest, logistic regression and decision tree classifiers, making the proposed attack the first effective attack executed against all state of the art API call based classifiers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II contains the relevant related work. Section III specifies our attack methodology, including surrogate model training and adversarial examples generation. Section IV contains our experimental results and a description of the implemented framework. Section V contains a discussion of possible defense mechanisms, our conclusions and future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This section is structured as follows: Sections II-A and II-B are presenting the theory behind the classifiers being used in this paper. Section II-C describes related work using API calls based malware classifiers. Section II-D describes attacks against machine learning classifiers, focusing on adversarial examples generation.
A. Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
Neural networks are a class of machine learning models made up of layers of neurons -elementary computing units.
A neuron takes an n-dimensional feature vector x = [x 1 , x 2 ...x n ] from the input or the lower-level neuron, and outputs a numerical output y = [y 1 , y 2 ...y m ], such that
to the neurons in higher layers or the output layer. For the neuron j, y j is the output and b j is the bias term, while w ji are the elements of a layer's weight matrix. The function φ is the non-linear activation function, such as sigmoid(), which determines the neuron's output. The activation function introduces non-linearities to the neural network model. Otherwise, the network remains a linear transformation of its input signals. Some of the success of DNNs is attributed to those multi-layers of non-linear correlations between features, which aren't available in popular traditional machine learning classifiers, such as SVM, which has at most a single non-linear layer using the kernel trick.
A group of m neurons forms a hidden layer which outputs a feature vector y. Each hidden layer takes the previous layer's output vector as the input feature vector and calculates a new feature vector for the layer above it:
where y l , W l and b l are the output feature vector, the weight matrix, and the bias of the l-th layer, respectively. Proceeding from the input layer, each subsequent higher hidden layer automatically learns a more complex and abstract feature representation which captures higher-level structure. DNNs' efectiveness in complex domains, such as computer vision, is often attributed to the usage of this characteristic, termed representation-learning, starting from raw input as features, instead of manual feature engineering.
B. Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs)
A limitation of neural networks is that they accept a fixedsized vector as input (e.g., an image) and produce a fixedsized vector as output (e.g., probabilities of different classes). Recurrent neural networks can use sequences of vectors in the input, the output, or both. In-order to do that, the RNN has a hidden state vector, the context of the sequence, which is combined with the current input to generate the RNN's output.
Given an input sequence [x 1 , x 2 ...x T ], the RNN computes the hidden vector sequence[h 1 , h 2 ...h T ] and the output vector sequence [y 1 , y 2 ...y T ] by iterating the following equations from t = 1 to T :
where the W terms denote weight matrices (e.g., W xh is the input-hidden weight matrix), the b terms denote bias vectors (e.g., b h is the hidden bias vector) and φ is usually an element-wise application of an activation function. DNNs without a hidden state, as specified in Equation 3 , reduce Equation 4 to the private case of Equation 2, known as feedforward networks.
1) Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM): Standard RNNs suffer from both exploding and vanishing gradients. Both problems are caused by the RNNs' iterative nature, in which the gradient is essentially equal to the recurrent weight matrix raised to a high power. These iterated matrix powers cause the gradient to grow or shrink at a rate that is exponential in terms of the number of time steps, T . The vanishing gradient problem does not necessarily cause the gradient itself to be small; the gradient's component in directions that correspond to long-term dependencies might be small, while the gradient's component in directions that correspond to short-term dependencies is large. As a result, RNNs can easily learn the short-term but not the long-term dependencies. For instance, a conventional RNN might have problems predicting the last word in: "I grew up in France... I speak fluent French." if the space between the sentences is large.
The LSTM architecture ( [14] ), which uses purpose-built memory cells to store information, is better at finding and exploiting long range context than conventional RNNs. The LSTM's main idea is that, instead of computing h t from h t−1 directly with a matrix-vector product followed by a nonlinear transformation (Equation 3), the LSTM directly computes △h t , which is then added to h t−1 to obtain h t .This implies that the gradient of the long-term dependencies cannot vanish.
2) Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU): [4] introduced the gated recurrent unit (GRU), which is an architecture that is similar to LSTM, but reduces the gating signals from three (in the LSTM model: input, forget and output) to two (and the associated parameters). The two gates are reffered to as an update gate and a reset gate. Some papers show that that GRU RNN is comparable to, or even outperforms, the LSTM in many cases, while using less training time.
3) Bidirectional Recurrent Neural Networks (BRNNs): One shortcoming of conventional RNNs is that they are only able to make use of previous context. It is often the case that for malware events the most informative part of a sequence occurs at the beginning of the sequence and may be forgotten by standard recurrent models. Bidirectional RNNs ( [34] ) overcome this issue by processing the data in both directions with two separate hidden layers, which are then fed forward to the same output layer. A BRNN computes the forward hidden sequence − → h t , the backward hidden sequence ← − h t and the output sequence y t by iterating the backward layer from t = T to 1 and the forward layer from t = 1 to T , and then updating the output layer. Combing BRNNs with LSTM gives bidirectional LSTM ( [10] ), which can access long-range context in both input directions.
C. Dynamic Analysis Machine Learning Malware Classifiers
Malware (malicious software) numbers are consistently on the rise. Machine learning malware classifiers, in which the model is trained on features extracted from the analyzed file, instead of signatures, have two main benefits: 1) The fact that the classifier is trained automatically on the malware samples saves costs and time compared to manually analyzing new malware variants. 2) They are based on features and not on a fingerprint of a specific and exact file (e.g., a file's hash), so they can better handle new threads that use the same features (assuming features indicative of maliciousness are used).
Malware classifiers can either use static features, gathered without running the code (e.g., n-gram byte sequence, strings or structural features of the inspected code) or dynamic features (e.g., CPU usage), collected during the inspected code run.
While using static analysis has a performance advantage, it has a major disadvantage: since the code isn't being run, the analyzed code might not reveal its "true features". For example, if one looks for specific strings in the file, one might not be able to catch polymorphic malware, in which those features are either encrypted or packed and decrypted only during run-time, by a specific bootstrap code. Other limitations of static analysis and techniques to counter it appear in [23] . The most prominent dynamic features are the sequences of API calls, particularly those made to the OS, which are termed system calls. Those system calls are harder to obfuscate during run time without harming the functionality of the code.
1) Traditional Machine Learning Malware Classifiers: The use of system calls to detect abnormal software behavior was shown in [7] . System call pairs (2-grams) from test traces were compared against those in the normal profile. Any system call pair not present in the normal profile is called a mismatch. If the number of system calls with mismatches in their window in any given time frame exceeded a certain threshold, an intrusion was reported.
Extensive work has been done in this domain, including research investigating the use of code-flow graphs and data taint graphs with various types of classifiers. A survey of the different features (e.g., monitoring API calls, arguments, and information flow) and tools used for dynamic analysis assisted malware classification was conducted in [5] .
2) Deep Neural Network Malware Classifiers: DNNs were used as malware classifiers using either static or dynamic features, outperforming traditional machine learning classifiers such as SVM ( [13] , [19] ). The rationale for this was explained in section II-A.
In [33] , the static features used by a DNN classifier were bins of byte value-entropy (to account for packed files), hash values of the PE imports strings, numerical values from the PE header and strings in file hash values. In [13] , API calls were used as static features for a stacked auto-encoder classifier, by extracting them from the file using a PE parser.
In [30] , both RNNs and echo state networks were used to classify files using API call sequences as dynamic features. A recurrent model was trained to predict next API call. The hidden state of the model (that encodes the history of past events) as a fixed-length feature vector was given to a separate classifier (logistic regression or multilayer perceptron). [2] compared RNN, LSTM and GRU architectures and found that LSTM outperformed others. A comparison was also made to a convolutional neural network (CNN), and it was proven that the sequence based RNN performs better.
Static and dynamic features can be used by the same classifier. For instance, null-terminated patterns observed in the memory of the process, tri-grams of system API calls, and distinct combinations of a single system API call and one input parameter were used by a DNN classifier in [18] .
Feed-forward DNNs and RNNs are sometimes combined to leverage the benefits of both. In [19] , a CNN was used as a preprocessing phase to an LSTM based on system calls, creating a feature extraction method that leverage the spatially local correlation in the system calls sequences.
D. Evasion Attacks
Attacks against machine learning classifiers, denoted as adversarial machine learning ( [17] ), appear in two main phases of the machine learning process: 1) During model training. For instance, a poisoning attack can be performed by inserting adversarily crafted samples to the training set as part of the baseline training phase of an anomaly detection classifier. 2) During the prediction phase. For example, an evasion attack involves modifying the analyzed sample's features to evade detection by the model. In this section we focus only on the latter, and particularly on the ability to perturb inputs so that they are misclassified by the model. Such inputs are called adversarial examples ([37] ).
Attacks also vary based on the amount of knowledge the adversary has about the classifier. A Black-box attack (e.g. [36] ) requires no knowledge about the model beyond the ability to query it as a black-box, i.e., inserting an input and getting the output classification (the oracle model). In a white-box attack, the adversary can have varying degrees of knowledge about the model architecture and hyper-parameters. Such knowledge can be gained either through internal knowledge or using a staged attack to reverse engineer the model beforehand ( [38] ). While white-box attacks tend to be more efficient than blackbox attacks ( [31] ), they are largely considered impractical and therefore not likely to be implemented.
1) The Transferability Property: Most black-box attacks rely on the concept of adversarial example transferability, presented in [37] : Adversarial examples crafted against one model are also likely to be effective against other models. This transferability property holds even when models are trained on different datasets. This means that the adversary can train a surrogate model, which has similar decision boundaries as the original model and perform a white-box attack on it. Adversarial examples that successfully fool the surrogate model would most likely fool the original model, as well ( [26] ). [29] studied the transferability between DNNs and other models such as decision tree and SVM models. [21] conducted a study of the transferability property over large models and a largescale dataset, showing that while transferable non-targeted adversarial examples are easy to find, targeted adversarial examples rarely transfer with their target labels.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to 1) explore transferability in RNN models, including conventional RNN, LSTM, GRU, and their bidirectional variants, 2) consider transferability between these RNN models, feedforward networks, and traditional machine learning classifiers, and 3) explain why attacks should be made against the most generalized classifier in order to leverage transferability by transitivity (Definition 1).
2) Mimicry Attacks and Other Evasion Attacks in Traditional Machine Learning: [39] introduced mimicry attacks, where an attacker is able to code a malicious exploit that mimics the system calls' trace of benign code, thus evading detection. Several methods were presented: 1) Causing benign system calls to generate malicious behavior by modifying the system calls' parameters. This works since most IDSs ignore the system call parameters. 2) Adding semantic noops -system calls with no effect, or those with an irrelevant effect, e.g.: opening a non-existent file. The authors showed that almost every system call can be no-opped and thus the attacker can add any no-op system call needed to achieve a benign system call sequence. 3) Performing equivalent attacks, using a different system call sequence to achieve the same (malicious) effect.
[36] implemented a white-box evasion attack for PDFRate, a random forest classifier for static analysis of malicious PDF files, by using either a mimicry attack of adding features to the malicious PDF to make it "feature-wise similar" to a benign sample, or by creating a SVM representation of the classifier and subverting it using the same method mentioned in [3] , assuming the availability of surrogate data for the adversary.
[40] used a genetic algorithm to generate an adversarial PDF sample that evades random forest and SVM classifiers used for malware detection. The fitness of the genetic variants obtained by mutation was defined in terms of the black box model's class probability predictions. In contrast, our proposed attack was verified against many types of classifiers, and is less computationally expensive.
3) DNN Adversarial Examples: [37] and [3] formalize the search for adversarial examples as a similar minimization problem:
The input x, correctly classified by the classifier f , is perturbed with r such that the resulting adversarial example x+r remains in the input domain D, but is assigned a different label than x. To solve Equation 5, we need to transform the constraint f (x+r) = f (x) to into an optimizable formulation. Then we can easily use the Lagrange multiplier to solve it. To do this, we define a loss function Loss(), to quantify this constraint. This loss function can be the same as the training loss, or it can be chosen differently, e.g. hinge loss or cross entropy loss. When dealing with malware classification tasks, differentiating between malicious (f (x) = 1) and benign (f (x) = −1), e.g. SVM, [3] suggested solving Equation 5 through gradient ascent. To minimize the size of the perturbation and maximize the adversarial effect, the white-box perturbation should follow the gradient direction (i.e., the direction providing the largest increase of model value, from one label to another). Therefore, the perturbation r in each iteration is calculated as:
where ǫ is a parameter controlling the magnitude of the perturbation introduced. By varying ǫ, this method can find an adversarial sample x + r.
[37] views the (white-box) adversarial problem as a constrained optimization problem, i.e., find a minimum perturbation in the restricted sample space. The perturbation is obtained by using Box-constrained L-BFGS to solve the following equation:
where c is a term added for the Lagrange multiplier. [9] introduced the white-box fast gradient sign method (FGSM). The intuition behind this attack is to linearize the cost function Loss() used to train a model f around the neighborhood of the training point x with a label l, that the adversary wants to force the misclassification of. Under this approximation:
The white-box Jacobian-based saliency map approach (JSMA) was introduced in [25] . The method iteratively perturbs features of the input that have large adversarial saliency scores. Intuitively, this score reflects the adversarial goal of taking a sample away from its source class towards a chosen target class.
First, the adversary computes the Jacobian of the model:
is the derivative of class j with respect to input feature i. To compute the adversarial saliency map, the adversary then computes the following for each input feature i:
∂xi | otherwise (9) where t is the target class that the adversary wants the machine learning model to assign. The adversary then selects the input feature i with the highest saliency score S(x, t)[i] and increases its value. The process is repeated until misclassification in the target class is achieved or the maximum number of perturbed features has been reached. This attack creates smaller perturbations with a higher computing cost, compared to [9] .
[26] generates a black-box adversarial example in a two phase process: 1) Substitute model training: the attacker queries the black-box model f with synthetic inputs selected by augmenting the initial set of inputs representative of the input domain with their FGSM perturbed variants, in order to build a modelf approximating f 's decision boundaries. 2) Adversarial sample crafting: the attacker uses substitute model f to craft adversarial samples, which are then misclassified by f due to the transferability of adversarial examples. This differs from our paper in that: 1) It deals with feed-forward networks (especially CNNs) as opposed to RNNs. 2) It doesn't fit the attack requirements of the cyber security domain, i.e., not harming the malware functionality; this is because changing a pixel color in an image is legitimate and would rarely cause a human to see a distorted image, whereas changing an API call would damage the code's functionality.
[11] presents a white-box evasion technique for an Android static analysis malware classifier. The features used were: permissions, hardware components, suspicious API calls, activities, services, content providers, broadcast receivers, and intents to communicate with other apps. Most of the features come from the AndroidManifest.xml file. The attack is performed iteratively in two steps, until a benign classification is achieved: 1) Compute the gradient of the white-box model with respect to the binary feature vector x. 2) Find the element in x , whose modification from 0 to 1 (i.e. only feature addition and not feature removal) would cause the maximum change in the benign score and add this manifest feature to the adversarial example. In contrast to our work, this paper didn't deal with dynamic features, which are more challenging to add without harming the malware functionality. This study also did not focus on a generic attack that can affect many types of classifiers, as we do. Moreover, our black-box assumption is more feasible than a white-box assumption.
[15] used API calls uni-grams as static features. If n API types are used, the feature vector dimension is n. A generative adversarial networks (GAN) was trained, where the discriminator simulates the malware classifier while the generator tries to generate adversarial samples that would be classified as benign by the discriminator, which uses labels from the black-box model. However, this attack doesn't fit RNN variants classifiers and is therefore less generic than our proposed method. In addition, we present a full end-to-end approach, using a mimicry attack. Finally, GANs are known for their unstable training process ( [1] ), making such an attack method difficult to rely on.
Existing research on adversarial samples mainly focuses on images. Images are represented as matrices with fixed dimensions, and the values of the matrices are continuous. API sequences consist of discrete symbols with variable lengths. Therefore, generating adversarial examples for API sequences will differ from generating adversarial examples for images. 4) RNN Adversarial Examples: [27] presented a whitebox adversarial examples attack against RNNs, demonstrated against LSTM architecture, for sentiment classification of a movie reviews dataset, where the input is the review and the output is whether the review was positive or negative. The adversary iterates over the words x[i] in the review and changes each word to z:
provides the direction one has to perturb each of the word embedding components in order to reduce the probability assigned to the current class, and thus change the class assigned to the sentence. However, the set of legitimate word embeddings is finite. Thus, one cannot set the word embedding coordinates to any real value. Instead, one finds the word z in dictionary D such that the sign of the difference between the embeddings of z and the original input word is closest to sign
This embedding takes the direction closest to the one indicated by the Jacobian as most impactful on the model's prediction. By iteratively applying this heuristic to a word sequence, one eventually finds an adversarial input sequence misclassified by the model. The differences between [27] and our paper are as follows: 1) We present a black-box attack, in which the adversary doesn't need prior knowledge about the malware classifier, which makes our attack more feasible. 2) We don't modify existing API calls, because while such an attack is relevant for reviews -it might damage a malware functionality which we wish to avoid.
Concurrently and independently from our work, [16] proposed a generative RNN based approach to generate invalid APIs and insert them into the original API sequences. A substitute RNN is trained to fit the targeted RNN. Gumbel-Softmax, a one-hot continuous distribution estimator, was used to smooth the API symbols and deliver gradient information between the generative RNN and the substitute RNN. Null APIs were added, but while they were omitted to make the generated adversarial sequence shorter, they remained in the gradient calculation of the loss function. This make the attack's success probability lower (as seen for the LSTM classifier), since the substitute model is used to classify the Gumbel-Softmax output, including the null APIs' estimated gradients, so it doesn't simulate the malware classifier exactly. In contrast, our attack method doesn't have this difference between the substitute model and the black-box model, since our generated API sequence are shorter. This makes our adversarial example faster and with higher success probability (Table II) . Unlike [16] , which focused only on LSTM variants, we also show our attack's effectiveness against other RNN variants such as GRU and conventional RNN, bidirectional and deep variants, and non-RNN classifiers (including both feed-forward networks and traditional machine learning classifiers such as SVM), making it truly generic. In addition, the stability issues associated with GAN training ([1]) apply to the attack method mentioned in [16] as well, making it hard to rely on. Finally, we developed an end-to-end framework, generating a mimicry attack (section II-D-2), instead-of an arbitrary API calls sequence that might harm the malware functionality (e.g., by inserting ExitProcess() API call in the middle of the malware code), showing that our approach works in real world scenarios (section IV-F).
III. METHODOLOGY

A. Black-Box API Call-Based Malware Classifier
Our classifier's input is a sequence of API calls made by the inspected code. It uses only the API call type and not the arguments or return value. One might claim that considering this data, which is recorded by tools such-as Cuckoo Sandbox, would make our attack easier to detect. This could be done, e.g., by looking for irregularities in the arguments of the API calls (e.g., invalid file handles, etc.) or consider only successful API calls and ignore failed APIs. In order to address this issue, we don't use null arguments that would fail the function. Instead, arguments that are valid but do nothing, such as writing into a temporary file instead of an invalid file handle, are being used in our framework, as described in section IV-E-1.
In-order to work with all of the classifiers we test, we use one-hot encoding for each API call type and feed the entire sequence to the classifier. The output of each classifier is binary: is the inspected code malicious or not. We tested several classifiers and their types and hyper-parameters are described in section IV-B.
B. Black-Box API-Call Based Malware Classifier Attack
The proposed attack has two phases: 1) Creating a surrogate model. 2) Generating adversarial examples against the surrogate model and use it against the attacked black-box model using the transferability property.
1) Creating a surrogate model: We use Jacobian-based dataset augmentation, an approach similar to [26] . This method limits the number of black-box model queries needed to train the surrogate model and ensures that the surrogate model is an approximation of the targeted model, i.e. it learns similar decision boundaries, although it might have a lower accuracy on unseen test sets. The method is specified in Algorithm 1.
We query the black-box model with synthetic inputs selected by a Jacobian-based heuristic to build a surrogate modelf , approximating the black-box model f 's decision boundaries. While the adversary is unaware of the architecture of the black-box model, we assume the basic features used (here: the recorded API calls type) are known to the attacker. In-order to learn similar decision boundaries as the blackbox model while using minimal amount of black-box model queries, the synthetic training inputs is based on prioritizing directions in which the model's output is varying. This is done by evaluating the sign of the Jacobian matrix dimension corresponding to the label assigned to input x by the blackbox model: sign(Jf (x)[f (x)]), as done by FGSM (Equation 8). We use the Jacobian matrix of the surrogate model, since we don't have access to the Jacobian matrix of the black-box model. The new synthetic data point
is added to the training set.
Algorithm 1 Surrogate Model Training
Input: f (black-box model), T (training epochs), X 1 (initial dataset), ǫ (perturbation factor) Define architecture for the surrogate model A for t=1..T: # Label the synthetic dataset using the black-box model:
The surrogate model is being trained on exponentiallyincreasing dataset size: |X t | = 2 t−1 |X 1 | X 1 , the initial dataset, should be representative. The reason is that we want the dataset augmentation to cover all decision boundaries. If we choose, e.g., only samples from a single family of ransomware as the initial dataset, we would focus only in a specific area of the decision boundary and our augmentation would probably take us only to a certain direction. Choosing more diverse input would increase the augmentation's effectiveness.
The samples we used were randomly selected samples from the test set (not the training set) distribution. The samples used in X 1 were removed from the test set without using them, to prevent the surrogate model to over-perform on them.
2) Generating adversarial examples: In the context of this section, an adversarial example is a sequence of API calls classified as malicious by the classifier, perturbed by adding API calls to it, so that the modified sequence would be misclassified as benign. We cannot remove or modify API calls, only add additional API calls, in-order to prevent damaging the code's functionality. In-order to add API calls in a way that doesn't hurt the code's functionality, we would generate a mimicry attack, using the methods mentioned in [39] . Our method is described in Algorithm 2. We discuss the implementation of the mimicry attack in section IV-E.
D is the vocabulary of available features. In the context of API calls based malware classifier, those are all the API calls recorded by the classifier. x * is the adversarial API calls sequence, with a length of l. Notice that it might be different from n, the length of API calls sequence that is being used by the classifier.⊥ is the concatenation operation:
is the insertion of the encoded api vector in position i of x * . The adversary randomly choose i since he/she does not have any knowledge to allow him/her to better select i without incurring significant statistical overhead. Notice that Algorithm 2 Adversarial Sequence Generation
(malicious sequence to perturb, of length l), D (vocabulary) x * = x # While the black-box model's classification of the perturbed example hasn't change (is still malicious):
Randomly select an API's position i in x * # Insert a new adversarial API in position i:
an insertion of an API in position i means that the APIs from position i..l (x * [i : l − 1] ) are "pushed back" one position to make room for the new API call, to maintain the original sequence and preserve the original functionality of the code. Since x * has a fixed length, the last API call, x * [l − 1] is being "pushed out" and removed from x * (this is why the term is ⊥ x * [i : l − 2] and not ⊥ x * [i : l − 1]). This might raise the concern that the proposed attack isn't really effective, but simply omit relevant information from the classifier: the last API calls still exist, but are not in the range of API calls being analyzed by the classifier anymore (only the first l are). However, in section IV-C-2 we would see that even malware classifiers based on shorter sequence lengths have roughly the same accuracy. Thus the APIs being omitted are not the reason for the proposed attack effectiveness.
The newly added API call is
The rationale is similar to the adversarial sequence generation described in [27] : sign(Jf (x)[f (x)]) gives us the direction in which we have to perturb the API calls sequence in order to reduce the probability assigned to the current class, f (x), and thus change the class assigned to the sequence. However, the set of legitimate API call embeddings is finite. Thus, we cannot set the new API to any real value in an adversarial sequence x * . To overcome this difficulty, we use the perturbation mentioned above. We find the API call api in dictionary D for which the sign of the difference between the embeddings of the new API added to the original sequence, and the original API calls sequence, is closest to sign(Jf (x)[f (x)]). This API call embedding takes the direction closest to the one indicated by the Jacobian as most impactful on the model's prediction. By iteratively applying this heuristic to sequence words, we eventually find an adversarial input sequence misclassified by the model. Notice that in [27] , the authors replaced a word in a movie review with another word, so they only needed a single element out of the Jacobian: For input word i, which was replaced. All other words remained the same, so no gradient change took place. In contrast, since we add an API call, all the existing API calls following it shift their position, so we need to consider the difference in the gradients of all partial derivatives for the label f (x)
following the position i.
The method mentioned in [27] could work on an API calls based malware classifier (and provide a better performance for the adversarial sequence generation) only if a single API equivalence attack exists, i.e. if one could find an alternative API that could replace an existing one, preserving its functionality. The problem is that in practice, even if such equivalent API exist, replacing it might still break the modified code's business logic. For instance, although fopen() and CreateFile() both open a file, fopen() returns a file descriptor, while CreateFile() returns a file handle. Therefore, subsequent calls to, e.g., ReadFile() would not work if no additional APIs are added to transform the file descriptor to a file handle. Those additional APIs make to original, more efficient partial Jacobian computation to be similar to our method. Therefore, we decided to add no-op API calls, giving us the ability to add any API call (with no-op arguments, such as WriteFile() of a temporary file) instead-of limiting ourselves only to API calls which have equivalents. The computational complexity remains the same.
While the proposed attack is designed for API calls based classifiers, it can be generalized to any adversarial sequence generation. This generalization is a high-performance attack, based on Definitions 3 and 4. This can be seen in section IV-C-3, where we compare the proposed attack to [27] for the IMDB sentiment classification task.
We make an assumption that the attacker knows D, i.e., what API calls are available and how each of them is encoded (one-hot encoding in this paper). This is a reasonable and commonly-accepted (e.g. in [17] ) assumption about the attacker's knowledge.
3) Generic Attack Using Transferability: In section III-B-2, we presented an attack against a white-box surrogate model. We now explain why the same adversarial examples generated against the surrogate model would be effective against both the black-box model and other classifier types as well. This is due to the principle of transferability. As mentioned in section II-D-1, since the decision boundaries of classifiers using datasets with a similar distribution are close to each other, gradientbased attacks that works against one classifier could work against the other as well.
Transferability has two forms relevant to this paper: 1) The adversary can craft adversarial examples against a surrogate model, such as the one generated in section III-A. If the decision boundary of the surrogate model is close enough to that of the black-box model, the same adversarial example would work against both ( [26] ). 2) An adversarial example crafted against one classifier type might work against a different classifier type, if their decision boundaries are close enough ( [36] ). The bigger the perturbation of the adversarial examples, the bigger the chance that the adversarial sample would cross the decision boundaries difference between the models. This means that the attack would be generic enough to be effective (by Definition 3) against other classifier types. In-order to define what makes adversarial attacks generic, we define the following property: Definition 1. An adversarial attack targeted against a classifier's architecture A c is transferable by transitivity to a classifier's architecture A s if: 1) The training set of both classifiers is large enough to reflect the distribution of the samples in the wild. 2) The attack that doesn't use any property which exists in A c but not in A s (e.g., [31] 's attack, which is specific against decision tree classifiers), and thus can work against A s without limitations. 3) A c is a generalized (more complex) model than A s -and the attack would therefore be transferable to A s , with similar decision boundaries, and simpler gradients.
The rationale behind the third part of Definition 1 is the following: Assuming both complex and simpler models are train on the same dataset (or on samples from the same distribution), training on large dataset should result in similar decision boundaries for both: the decision boundaries that reflect the exact distribution of the samples, that is, the "ideal" classifier for that training set. The larger the training-sets, the closer they are to the same distribution, of actual benign vs malicious samples in the wild. Therefore, assuming the training sets are large enough (Definition 1, part 1), the main difference between the decision boundaries of A c and A s are the gradients of the classifier: Most attacks (including the attack presented in Algorithm 2) perturb in the direction of the gradient, either approximated ( [9] ), fully evaluated (Algorithm 2), or in a specific direction ( [27] ). Thus, if the gradients of the models are similar, the attack is more likely to be transferable. Why do we assume an attack is transferable from complex to simpler models? When a more complex model A c is a general case of the simpler model A s , it is assumed to be a better approximation of the ideal classifier (under Definition 1, part 1 assumption): more non-linear correlations between features or features' abstractions, etc. If the model better represents the ideal classifier, its gradients better represent the (feature-wise) direction in which the classification changes.
The proposed attack, an adversarial attack against RNN variants is transferable by transitivity to the other tested classifiers: 1) The targeted black-box classifier was trained on a large dataset (500,000 samples), representing the malware distribution in the wild. 2) The attack doesn't use any specific property of RNN classifiers (and in fact, a similar attack was proposed against feed-forward networks in [26] ). 3) RNN variants are a generic form of feed-forward networks (where the hidden state weight is always 0) and therefore their decision boundaries are a generalized case of feed-forward networks for the same dataset, either. Feed-forward DNNs, in turn, are generalized form of several traditional machine learning classifiers. For instance, the linear SVM classification score is: y = wx+ b. It is based on the sum of features multiplied by the weights of the SVM model w and an added bias b. A linear SVM's equation is identical to Equation 1, an artificial neuron equation, with a linear activation function: φ(x) = x. However, adding more neurons in the same layer or hidden layers in a DNN make it a generalized form of linear SVM. Therefore, the attack presented here against RNN variants would be transferable by transitivity to feedforward networks simplified case and from there transferable by transitivity to the linear SVM classifier simplified case. In this way, attacks against generalized models are transferable and effective against simpler models. The evaluation to backup this claim is provided in section IV-D.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time both forms of transferability mentioned above are being evaluated in the context of RNN variants. In section IV-D we would show that the proposed attack is effective against the widest range of classifiers ever reviewed against a single attack: against RNN variants (like LSTM, GRU, etc.), against feed-forward DNNs (including CNNs) and against traditional machine learning classifiers such as SVM and random forest.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Dataset
Our dataset contains 500,000 files (250,000 benign samples and 250,000 malware samples), including the latest variants. For example, among the malware samples in our dataset we have ransomware families such as Cerber, Locky, CryptoWall, TeslaCrypt, Petya and many other families and malware types.
Since we're implementing a supervised learning classifier, we need reliable labels. We therefore labeled our dataset using VirusTotal 1 , an on-line scanning service which contains more than 60 different security products. Our ground truth is: malicious sample is one with 15 or more positive (that is, malware) classification from the various VirusTotal products. A benign sample is one with 0 positive classifications. All other samples (with 1-14 positives) were omitted to prevent FP contamination of the dataset.
In-order to extract the API calls of the inspected code, we run each sample in Cuckoo Sandbox 2 , a commonly-used malware analysis system, for 2 minutes per sample. We used a python script to parse the JSON file generated by Cuckoo Sandbox, and extracted the API call sequences generated by the inspected code during its execution. The extracted API call sequences are the malware classifier's features. Although the JSON can be used as raw input for a neural network classifier, as done in [32] , we parsed it, since we wanted to focus only on API calls, without adding other features such as file paths or other features being extracted by Cuckoo Sandbox.
The overview of the malware classification process is shown in Figure 1 . We run the samples on a VirtualBox's 3 snapshot with Windows 10 OS, since most malware target the Windows OS 4 .
Several issues arise during this dataset analysis. One issue is that Cuckoo Sandbox is a tool known to malware writers, some of them write code to detect if the malware is running in a Cuckoo Sandbox (or any virtual machine, for that matter) and if so -quit immediately to prevent reversing efforts. In those cases, the file is malicious, but its behavior recorded in Cuckoo Sandbox, or API calls sequence in this case -isn't. To mitigate the contamination of our dataset, we used two counter-measures: 1) We applied Yara rules 5 to detect sandbox programs such as Cuckoo and omitted all samples using those techniques. 2) We considered only API call sequences with more than 15 API calls (as in [30] ), to make sure there are enough API calls to make a valid classification. This filtering left us with 400,000 valid samples, after removing some benign samples to keep the dataset balanced. One might argue that those evasive malwares, which apply those techniques, are extremely challenging and relevant. However, in this paper we focus on the adversarial attack. This attack is generic enough to work for those evasive malware either, assuming that other mitigation techniques, such as anti-anti-VM, would be applied so one can successfully monitor their true API calls sequence.
Another issue is the maximal sequence length. While RNN variants can handle variable sequence lengths, other classifiers, for which we want to apply the attack by transferability, don't. Therefore, adversarial examples that fit variable sequence lengths might be too long for such classifiers, e.g., fullyconnected DNN. Moreover, using variable sequence lengths, or even fixed but long sequence length increases the training time substantially, with only marginal effect on the accuracy, as shown in [30] . Finally, since malware code tends to run for shorter time than benign code (e.g. dropper software that downloads a malicious payload and quits vs. a benign UI application, remaining running until the user decides to quit), not limiting the API calls sequence length would cause the classifier to learn: "long sequence is benign", which is not the API based decision we are looking for. Therefore, we limited our maximum sequence length to n = 140 API calls and padded shorter sequences with zeros. Zeros stands for a null API in our one-hot encoding. While it is true that such a malware classifier can be evaded, e.g., by running bogus 140 benign API calls before staring the true malware API calls, this knowledge is available for a white-box attacker, not a blackbox one. This evasion technique can be mitigated by randomly selecting the number of API calls for the training set each time the model is being trained, or creating an ensemble various API call sequence length models, as would be shown in future work. In fact, using the last 140 API calls in the sequence provided similar accuracy as using the first 140, showing that the context of the sequence usually exists along the entire sequence. Moreover, none of those techniques damage the generality of the black-box attack we described in section III-B, which is suitable for any API calls sequence length.
The final filtered training set size is 360,000 samples, 36,000 samples of which are the validation set. The test set size is 36,000 samples. All sets are balanced between malicious and benign samples.
B. Malware Classifier Performance
Since no open-source API calls based deep learning intrusion detection system is available, we created our own black-box malware classifiers. We tested several classifiers. As mentioned in section IV-A, as input, all of them get the vector of n = 140 first API call types in one-hot encoding, and produce a binary classification: malicious or benign.
We used the Keras 6 implementation for all neural network classifiers, with Tensorflow used for the back-end. XGBoost 7 and Scikit-Learn 8 were used for all other classifiers.
The loss function used for training was binary cross-entropy. We used the Adam optimizer for all of the neural networks. The output layer was fully connected with sigmoid activation for all NNs. We fine-tuned the hyper-parameters for all classifiers based on the relevant state-of-the-art papers, e.g., number of hidden layers from [18] and [11] , drop-out rate from [18] and number of trees in a random forest classifier and the decision trees splitting criteria from [31] . For neural networks, a rectified linear unit, ReLU (x) = max(0, x), was chosen as an activation function due-to its fast convergence ( [8] ) compared to sigmoid() or tanh(), and dropout ( [35] ) was used to improve the generalization potential of the network. Training was conducted for maximum of 100 epochs, but convergence was usually reached after 15-20 epochs, depending on the type of classifier. A batch size of 32 samples was used for training.
The classifiers also have the following classifier-specific hyper-parameters: • Random forest classifier -Using 10 decision trees with unlimited maximum depth and the Gini criteria for choosing the best split. • Gradient boosted decision tree -Up to 100 decision trees with a maximum depth of 10 each. We measured the performance of the classifiers using the accuracy ratio, which applies equal weight to both FP and FN (unlike precision or recall), therefore providing an unbiased overall performance indicator:
where: TP -true positives (malicious samples being classified as malicious by the black-box classifier), TN -true negatives, FP -false positives (benign samples being classified as malicious), FN -false negatives.
The performance of the classifier is shown in Table I . The accuracy was measured on the test set, which contains 36,000 samples. As can be seen in Table I , the RNN classifier has poorer performance than the LSTM and GRU, and LSTM performs better than GRU. This can be explained by the fact that both GRU and LSTM classifiers don't suffer from the exploding and vanishing gradients problem as much as conventional RNN, and can thus leverage long term context (as explained in section II-B-1). LSTM is better than GRU due-to its more flexible (and complex) architecture (input, output and forget gates instead-of FRU's update and reset gates, allowing finergrained control of what parts of the state to propagate), which gives it improved accuracy, albeit the expanse of a longer training period (as explained in section II-B-2). These results are in line with the comparison in [2] . As shown in the table, the bidirectional RNN variants have better accuracy than the unidirectional variants (with the exception of GRU), due-to their ability to "remember" the beginning of long sequences (as explained in section II-B-3). BLSTM (both shallow and deep variants), is the best malware classifier, accuracy-wise, and, as shown in Table II , is also one of the classifiers most resistant to the proposed attack, meaning the proposed attack had poor performance against BLSTM (based on Definitions 3 and 4). The deep LSTM and BLSTM show some improvement over their shallow variants, meaning that higher abstraction of this dataset by representation learning provides more correlation between the feature abstractions. The deep LSTM and BLSTM variants are also the most resistant to our attack, as shown in Table II .
We also see that the feed-forward networks, both a fullyconnected DNN and 1D CNN have a very good performance. This is due to the small sequence length which allows the entire sequence to observed at once and therefore find all the correlations between the sequence elements. The 1D CNN, treating each API as a word in a paragraph, finds spatial correlation between adjacent API calls, making this architecture suited to the task, similar to CNN success in the NLP domain. However, both feed-forward networks and CNNs are expected to be less suited to real-world use cases. Such cases involve longer sequence lengths than can be consumed at once and online classification based on partial API call traces. We added CNNs and feed-forward networks to show that the proposed attack is generic and that transferability works between RNN variants and feed-forward networks, either.
Finally, we see that traditional machine learning classifiers perform poorer than RNN variants and feed-forward networks. This is due-to the fact that they have less levels of non-linear correlations between the features, making them less accurate. The exception are random forest and gradient boosted decision trees (GBDT), which compensate this deficiency with their ensemble model, combining different decision trees for, e.g., different API call flows, like a decision tree for ransomware vs full disk encryption benign applications, etc.
As mentioned in section IV-A, using the last 140 API calls in the sequence (padding the beginning, if needed) provide similar results, e.g., for the LSTM classifier, the accuracy is 97.49%.
C. Attack Performance
In-order to measure the performance of an attack, we consider two factors:
The attack effectiveness is the number of malware samples out of the test set which were successfully classified by the black-box malware classifier as malicious, but their adversarial sequences generated by Algorithm 2 were misclassified by the black-box malware classifier. We also consider the overhead that is caused by the proposed attack. The attack overhead is the average number of API calls which were added by Algorithm 2 to a malware sample in-order make the sample classified as benign (therefore calculated only for successful attacks) by the black-box model, as a percentage of the total API calls sequence length:
attack overhead = average added AP Is n
A high-performance attack would be combining the maximal attack effectiveness with the minimal attack overhead.
Based on Definitions 3 and 4, the proposed attack performance is specified in Table II . We can see from Table II that the proposed attack has a very high effectiveness against all tested malware classifiers, usually over 99%, while the overhead is usually 5-10% additional APIs. BLSTM and the deep variants of LSTM and BLSTM are the most resistant to the proposed attack, with Bidirectional GRU and GBDT are close behind, but even in those cases the attack effectiveness is more than 90% while the attack overhead is less than 30%.
We also see a strong negative correlation between the attack effectiveness and the additional API calls. This is a direct result of Algorithm 2 implementation: the harder it is for the algorithm to generate a successful misclassification, the more APIs would be added. The exceptions to this rule are Bidirectional GRU and GBDT, which have a relatively high attack effectiveness but also have a high attack overhead.
As mentioned in section IV-A, |T estSet(f )| = 36, 000 samples and the test set T estSet(f ) is balanced, so the attack performance was measured on about: |{f (x) = M alicious|x ∈ T estSet(f )}| = 18, 000 samples. For the surrogate model used in this attack we used a perturbation factor of ǫ = 0.2 and a learning rate of 0.1. |X 1 | = 70 (randomly selected out of a test set of 36,000 samples) was used. We used T = 6 surrogate epochs. Thus, as shown in section III-B-1, the training set size for the surrogate model is: |X 6 | = 2 5 * 70 = 2240 samples, only 70 of them were picked from the test set distribution and all others were synthetically generated. Using lower values, e.g., |X 1 | = 50 or T = 5 achieved a much worse attack performance.
For simplicity and training time, we used l = n for Algorithm 2, i.e. the adversary is trying to modify the same number of API calls that is used by the black-box classifier. However, even if this is not the case the attack effectiveness doesn't degrade by much. For instance, for LSTM classifier, with the same hyper-parameters specified in section IV-B, using l = 100, n = 140 caused the attack effectiveness to reduce from 100.00% to 99.99%, while the attack overhead raised from 3.19% to 11.5%. Using the opposite configuration (that is, l > n) caused no reduction in the attack effectiveness at all, only an increase in the attack overhead with the same proportion. The rationale is that if l > n, the adversary would keep trying modifying different API calls positions in Algorithm 2, until he modifies the ones impacting the blackbox classifier, either, increasing the attack overhead. However, if l < n, the adversary can modify only a subset of the API calls affecting the black-box classification, and this sub-set might not be enough to affect the classification as desired, reducing the attack effectiveness. The closer l and n are -the better the attack performance.
The adversary is choosing the architecture for the surrogate model without any knowledge of the attacked model architecture. However, some choices lead to better performance. We have chosen GRU surrogate model with 64 units (different from the malware classifier in section IV-B), since it provides generalized decision boundaries, providing transferability by transitivity (see Definition 1) to feed forward networks and traditional machine learning classifiers, resulting in a high attack effectiveness by Definition 3. It also have a shorter training time compared to other RNN variants, e.g. LSTM, which provided a similar attack effectiveness. Besides the classifier's type and architecture, we also used a different optimizer for the surrogate model: Adadelta optimizer, insteadof Adam for the black-box model (section IV-B). In our implementation, we used the cleverhans library 9 1) Comparison to Random Perturbation: In order to make sure that our attack is indeed effective, we need a baseline comparison. We used random perturbation for that: we keep adding random (instead of the minimal Jacobean difference based on a surrogate model, as the attack method described in Algorithm 2) API calls to the malicious sample sequence until a benign classification by the black-box model is achieved. We have used the deep BLSTM malware classifier with the same hyper-parameters mentioned in section IV-B, since it's the most resistant to the proposed attack, so the difference from the random attack should be the smallest. However, we see that even in this scenario, the attack effectiveness (by Definition 3) of the random perturbation method is 70.14% while the attack overhead (by Definition 4) is 47.86%: lower effectiveness and 1.5 times higher overhead, even in the successful adversarial examples. For shallow BLSTM the attack effectiveness of the random perturbation method is 87.41% while the attack overhead is 30.12%. Again, lower effectiveness and 1.5 times higher overhead. For other cases, not shown due to space limit, the results are similar, showing that the proposed attack performs better than random perturbation. In section IV-C-3 we show another comparison to previous work attack.
2) Sequence Length's Effect on Classification: One might claim that the reason the proposed attack is successful is that when adding a no-op API call, the last "actual" API call is deleted to keep the lengths of x and x * equal (Algorithm 2). Therefore, we're actually deleting some of the data used by the malware classifier for the classification and this is the reason for the attack effectiveness and not the added API calls. In-order to verify that this deletion of relevant data is not the reason that the attack is effective, we trained models with smaller sequence lengths. We show the results in Table III only for an LSTM malware classifier due to space limit, but those numbers are similar to other classifiers, either: We see that while longer sequence lengths do cause an increase in the classifier's accuracy, this effect is negligible (less than 1% accuracy difference).
Since, as mentioned in section IV-A, we used a maximal sequence length of n = 140 API calls, an attack overhead of 20.04% (for BLSTM, in Table II) is actually an addition of 28.06 API calls on average to the first 140 API calls in the inspected sequence, by Definition 4.
In the worst case from the attack overhead perspective, deep BLSTM, in which there are additional 42 API calls on average, 42 API calls are being deleted from the end of the sequence, so the first 100 API calls from the original sequence still exists in the adversarial sequence. Therefore, according to Table III , one would expect the accuracy to reduce by less than 1%. However, deep BLSTM has an attack effectiveness of more than 90%, meaning 9 out of 10 attacks are successful, not 1 out of 100, due-to the accuracy reduction caused by the usage of shorter original sequences. This means that the deleted APIs have a negligible effect and the added APIs are the cause to the attack effectiveness.
3) Comparison to Previous Work: To the best of our knowledge, besides [16] , which was written concurrently and independently from our work, [27] is the only published RNN adversarial attack up to date. [27] is somewhat similar to our proposed attack, specified in section III-B. The differences from this paper, as mentioned in section II-D-4, are: 1) Our attack is black-box, not white-box. 2) We don't modify existing API calls to prevent damage to the malware functionality. However, we want to compare our attack to previous work in terms of performance, that-is, in terms of effectiveness (Definition 3) and overhead (Definition 4).
In order to do that, we implemented both our proposed attack and the attack presented in [27] , using the IMDB sentiment classification dataset, instead-of the dataset used in section IV-A. We used 5,000 samples for training, 5,000 samples for validation and 5,000 samples for test. We used the first 80 words in each review, padding with zeros if the review was shorter. All sequences were one-hot encoded. We used the 20,000 most frequent words in the reviews. The classifier used is LSTM, with the same hyper-parameters as specified in section IV-B. For our attack, we used the same surrogate model type and hyper-parameters as in sections IV-B and IV-C.
The performance comparison is shown in Table IV . Notice that for Papernot et al. '16 , the overhead is the number of modified review words -not added words. We can see that although our attack is a black-box attack while the other attack is a white-box attack, both have the same effectiveness. While both attacks have high effectiveness, our attack has a much lower overhead. A possible reason is that adding words instead of modifying existing words cause less damage to the structure of the original sentence, which require less modification in-order to fix, thus preventing structure irregularities of the review to be classified as adversarial or negative. For instance, an example shown in [27] : "I wouldn't rent this one even on dollar rental night." was modified into "Excellent wouldn't rent this one even on dollar rental night." by their attack, destroying the original sentence structure. However, using our attack would generate the sequence: "I wouldn't resist rent this one even on dollar rental.", which has a more coherent structure.
D. Transferability for RNN Models
While transferability was covered in the past in the context of DNNs (e.g. [37] ), to our knowledge, this is the first time it is being evaluated in the context of RNNs, proving that the proposed attack is generic not just against a specific RNN variant, but is also transferable between RNN variants (like LSTM, GRU, etc.), feed-forward DNNs (including CNNs) and traditional machine learning classifiers such as SVM and random forest, due to its transferability by transitivity.
As mentioned in section III-B-3, transferability has two different forms relevant to this paper: 1) The adversary can craft adversarial examples against a surrogate model with a different architecture from the black-box model and the same adversarial example would work against both. 2) An adversarial example crafted against one black-box classifier type might work against a different black-box classifier type.
Both of those transferability forms can be evaluated in Table  II : 1) As mentioned in section IV-C, we used a GRU surrogate model. However, as can be seen from the first eight lines of Table II , the attack effectiveness is high even when the black-box classifier is not GRU. Even when the black-box classifier is indeed GRU, the hyper-parameters, such as the number of units and the optimizer are different. 2) The attack was designed against RNN variants. However, we tested it and found it effective against both feed-forward networks and traditional machine learning classifiers, as can be seen from the last seven lines of Table II .
Finally, we want to show another case of transferability by transitivity, i.e., as hypothesized in section III-B-3, the property of an attack designed against generalized models is generic enough to deal with simpler forms of classifiers, while the opposite is not always true. To do that, we used a more complex and generalized surrogate classifier model, deep GRU, instead of shallow GRU, since it has more hidden layers. When generating an adversarial sequence against a deep GRU (complex) surrogate model and then performing it against a (simple) BLSTM black-box classifier, the attack effectiveness is 94.58% and the overhead is 24.26%. However, when doing the opposite, attacking a deep BLSTM blackbox model using an adversarial sequence generated against a shallow GRU surrogate model, we can see from Table II that the performance is much worse: attack effectiveness is 91.75% and the overhead is 29.63%. Other classifiers' types exhibit the same trend, not shown due to space limits. This means that a sequence generated against the more generalized surrogate case has a higher effectiveness against a simple black-box model than the other way around.
E. GADGET: End-to-End Attack Framework Description
To verify an attacker can create an end-to-end attack using the proposed method in section III, we implemented GADGET: Generative Api aDversarial Generic Example by Transferability framework. This is an end-to-end attack generation framework, which gets as an input a black-box classifier (denoted f in section III), an initial surrogate model training set (denoted X 1 in Algorithm 1) and a malware binary to evade f , and outputs a modified malware binary, which API calls sequence is misclassified by f as benign, generating the surrogate model (denotedf in Algorithm 1) in the process.
GADGET contains the following components: 1) Algorithms 1 and 2, implemented in Python, using Keras with Tensorflow back-end. 2) A C++ Wrapper to wrap the malware binary and modify its generated API calls sequence during runtime. 3) A python script that wrap the malware binary with the above-mentioned wrapper, making it ready to deploy. The components appear in Figure 2 . When implementing a practical end-to-end attack, we have two main challenges: 1) Adding API calls without harming the code's functionality. 2) Doing so in a generic way, that is, without access or modification of the malware source code.
1) Adding API Calls without Damaging Functionality: As mentioned in section III-B-2, we decided implementing Algorithm 2 using a mimicry attack ([39] ).
We discarded equivalence attacks (i.e. using different API calls to implement the same desired functionality) and disguise attacks (using the same API type as the benign sequence with different parameters to implement malicious functionality), since they lack the flexibility needed to modify every API call. Therefore, we implemented a no-op attack, adding APIs which would have no effect on the code's functionality. This method has two variants: 1) Calling the desired API with invalid parameters, making it fail. For example: reading from an invalid file handle. This can be done to nearly all API calls with arguments. API calls without arguments can usually be called and ignored. However, since some API call monitors, such as Cuckoo Sandbox, also monitor the return value of an API call, and might ignore failed API calls, we need to implement the API addition in a different way. 2) No-Op API calls with valid parameters, e.g., reading 0 bytes from a valid file. This was more challenging to add, since a different implementation should be taken for each API. However, this effort can be done once and then be used for every malware, as we've done in our framework. Once done, it makes detecting that those APIs are invalid much harder, since the API call runs correctly, with a return value indicating of success. Further measures can be taken by the attacker to prevent the detection of the no-op APIs by analyzing the arguments of the API calls, e.g., choosing randomly between several no-op arguments per API call, instead-of hard-coding them.
2) Implementing a Generic Framework: The requirements from the generic framework are: 1) No access to the malware source code should be needed -only access to the malware binary executable.
2) The same code should work for every adversarial sample: no adversarial example specific code should be written.
The reasons for those requirements are two-fold. First, a malware is a software like every software: Once the code was tested and is bug-free, you don't want to change the business logic, since you might introduce new bugs that would harm the malware functionality. The case is even more acute here, since the additional APIs might change with every version of the malware classifier model (that is, with every update of its training set), causing another session of malware code modification and testing. Adding the code as a wrapper without changing the business logic shortens this cycle for the malware developers, making it a more immediate threat. Second, today, with the Malware-As-A-Service trend, not everyone who uses a malware has its code. Some ransomware are automatically generated, with only a minimal configuration, without source code access (e.g. the CNC server which is modified by each user). Thus, the GADGET framework expands the amount of people who can produce an evasive malware from malware developers only, to every person purchasing a malware binary, making the threat much bigger.
In-order to meet those requirements, we've chosen the following implementation: We would not change the malware binary, but wrap it from the outside with another layer (fulfilling requirement #1) which acts as a proxy between the malware code and the OS dlls that implement the API calls (e.g. kernel32.dll). This wrapper code would get the adversarial example sequence based on the original malware binary, generated by Algorithm 2, as a configuration file or a resource inside the wrapper dll. The logic of the wrapper code would be to hook all APIs that would be monitored by the malware classifier. Those API calls are known to the attacker, as mentioned in section III-B-2. The attacker generated hooks would call the requested APIs (to preserve the original malware functionality), keep track of the executed API sequence so far and add the adversarial example additional API calls in the proper place based on the configuration file, instead-of hard-coding the adversarial sequence to the code (fulfilling requirement #2). This flow is presented in Figure  2(b) .
The wrapper hooks need to be called before the classifier's sensors (here Cuckoo Sandbox) hooks the called APIs inorder to monitor them. Therefore, and in-order to prevent the wrapper's API hooking implementation be dependent on the API monitor implementation, we decided to generate a new malware binary, making the hooks part of it, by patch the malware binary. We used IAT Patcher 10 to patch the malware binary IAT, redirecting the API calls addresses there to the matching C++ wrapper API hook implementation. In this way, when another hook monitors the API calls, the adversarial APIs are already being called and monitored like any regular API call.
While we could theoretically run Algorithm 2 during runtime, inside the wrapper, instead-of using the configuration file, this would cause a much bigger overhead for the (wrapped) malware code.
F. GADGET in Action: WannaCry Use Case
One of the families that did not exist in the training set was the WannaCry ransomware 11 . This makes it an excellent candidate to test GADGET. First, we run the sample via Cuckoo Sandbox and recorded its API calls. The LSTM malware classifier mentioned in section IV-B successfully detected it as malicious, although it was not part of the training set. Then we used our framework to generate a new WannaCry variant, providing it the configuration file to implement the adversarial sequence generated by Algorithm 2. We run the modified WannaCry binary, wrapped with our framework and the configuration file in Cuckoo Sandbox again, and fed the recorded API call sequence to the same LSTM malware classifier. This time, the malware classifier classification was benign, although the malicious functionality remains: files were still being encrypted by the new binary, as can be seen in the Cuckoo Sandbox snapshot and API call sequence. This means that the proposed attack was successful, end-to-end, without damaging WannaCry's functionality.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have shown a generic black-box attack, generating adversarial sequences against RNN variants malware classifiers. Unlike previous adversarial attacks, we have shown that this attack is generic due-to its transferability by transitivity property, and is the first attack with a verified effectiveness against all relevant common classifiers: RNN variants, feed-forward networks and traditional machine learning classifiers. Therefore, this is a true black-box attack, since it requires the attacker to know nothing about the classifier besides the monitored APIs. We have also shown that this attack out-performs both base-line random attack and previously published attacks, both in its overhead and effectiveness. We have also created the GADGET framework as a proof of concept, showing that the generation of the adversarial sequences can be done end-to-end, in a generic way, without access to the malware source code. This increase the suggested attack feasibility in real world scenarios.
The most resistant classifiers to this attack are BLSTM, deep BLSTM and deep LSTM, followed by Bidirectional GRU and GBDT. However, GBDT fits less to real world scenarios, suchas on-line classifiers which classify partial API calls feed, inorder to classify a malware before any damage infection is done to the machine. In addition, the order of the API calls has significance (e.g., ReadFile() before WriteFile() has different meaning than a reversed order) and this is harder to account for by using GBDT.
Our future work would be in two areas: Defense mechanisms against such attacks and attack modifications to cope with such mechanisms. Due to space limits, we would publish an in-depth analysis of various defense mechanisms to future work. However, in this section we shortly describe previously explored work in the area and its relevance for our attack.
The defense mechanisms are divided into two sub-groups: 1) Detection of adversarial examples. 2) Making the classifier resistant to adversarial attack.
A. Detection of Adversarial Examples
Several methods have been suggested to detect whether a sample is an adversarial example.
[12] leverages the fact that adversarial samples have a different distribution from normal samples. The statistical differences between them can be detected using a high-dimensional statistical test of maximum mean discrepancy. [6] detects adversarial examples using two new features: kernel density estimates in the subspace of the last hidden layer of the original classifier, and Bayesian neural network uncertainty estimates. [22] augments deep neural networks with a small "detector" subnetwork which is trained on the binary classification task of distinguishing genuine data from data containing adversarial perturbations. To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no published and evaluated method to detect RNN adversarial sequences. This would be a part of our future work.
Moreover, a main issue with those methods is that in the cyber security domain, the question of what to do after detecting an adversarial example remains open. Would such a sequence be blocked? Be classified as malicious? This might increase the FP rate, due to misclassifying samples as adversarial examples and then treat them as malicious. At the worst case, an adversary aware of such a defense mechanism might perform a denial of service attack by wrapping benign applications with our GADGET framework, in-order for the attacked benign applications to be misclassified as adversar-ial\malicious and be blocked. Only reporting such cases is also not an option in the cyber security domain since this allows malicious files wrapped with the GADGET framework to evade being blocked.
B. Making the Classifier Resistant to Adversarial Attacks
Another option, instead-of actively trying to detect adversarial examples is passively trying to make the classifier more robust against such attacks.
Distillation ( [28] ) is a mechanism designed to compress large models into smaller ones while preserving prediction accuracy. In order to do that, the large model labels data with class probabilities, which are then used to train the small model. Instead of compression, the authors apply distillation to increase the robustness of DNNs to adversarial samples. They report that the additional entropy in probability vectors (compared to labels) yields models with smoother output surfaces. However, [26] showed that defensive distillation can be evaded using a black-box attack. We would not show that our attack is also immune to distillation, due to space limits. This would be detailed in our future work. However, the reason for our attack immunity is explained in [24] : When applying defense methods that smooth a model's output surface, the adversary cannot craft adversarial examples because the gradients it needs to compute (e.g., the derivative of the model output with respect to its input) have values close to zero. However, in this paper, we use a surrogate model to craft adversarial examples. The surrogate model is not impacted by the defensive mechanism and will still have the gradients necessary to find adversarial directions. Due to the adversarial example transferability property, the adversarial examples crafted using the surrogate would also be misclassified by the black-box model.
Adversarial training was suggested in [37] which demonstrated injecting adversarial samples, correctly labeled, in the training set as a means to make the model robust. In [9] this reduced the misclassification rate of a MNIST model from 89.4% to 17.9% on adversarial examples. We would not show that our attack is more resistant to adversarial training than other attacks discussed in those papers due to space limit. This would be shown in future work. However, the intuition for that is: API calls have a limited range of discrete values, in-contrast to images, which have a wider range of possible values. Thus, when we follow the gradients in Algorithm 2, we actually transforming our samples to be closer to real benign samples distribution, making it harder to separate between them and benign samples. This is not what happens with images, where adversarial examples have a third distribution, which is different from other labels distributions and can thus be easily classified correctly.
Finally, since our attack modifies only a specific feature type (API calls), combining several types of features, either dynamic or both static and dynamic features ( [18] ) might make the system more resistant to adversarial examples against a specific feature type. We would show on our future work that combining attacks against feature-specific classifiers, e.g., as done in [21] , is an effective way to bypass classifiers based on multiple types of features, due-to transferability.
To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no published and evaluated method to make an RNN model resistant to adversarial sequences. This would also be a part of our future work.
